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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Scholars hail the Internet as humanity’s nearest realization of Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s utopian “marketplace of ideas.”1 It provides anyone with a computer and an 
Internet connection the opportunity to publish her opinion to wide audiences on the 
political and social issues of the day.2 Yet this unprecedented opportunity is often 
squandered; more often than not, Internet publishers focus their energies on inane, 
trivial, narcissistic, and, at times, downright offensive commentary.3 Such speech, 
coupled with the ease of wide distribution, holds the potential to exact harm on 
innocent people and businesses, no matter their level of popularity among the public.4
 In the United States, freedom of speech is valued as one of the most basic and 
important rights of a free and democratic society.5 However, this right is limited in 
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Fred H. Cate, Law in 
Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565, 578 (1996) (“The ‘marketplace’ metaphor, however worthy, has had little 
meaning in the physical world, where the ability to reach large audiences is controlled by a handful of 
major media corporations. On the Internet, however, anyone . . . has the same access to the same on-line 
audience as the largest broadcaster and newspaper.”); Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications 
Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 137, 137 (2008) (“Over the course 
of the past two decades, ‘speakers and publishers from all walks of life and from every corner of the 
world’ have ‘f locked to the internet,’ resulting in ‘the most participatory marketplace of mass speech 
that this country—and indeed the world—has yet seen.’” (quoting both ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 
824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff ’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), and Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public 
Forum in Cyberspace, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1115, 1119 (2005))); Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking 
Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 Comm. L. & Pol’y 405, 407 (2003) 
(“The Internet has emerged as a true marketplace of ideas . . . .”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John 
Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 Duke L.J. 855, 893 (2000) (“Scholars have touted the 
Internet as the living embodiment of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor that lies at the heart of First 
Amendment theory.”).
2. See Cate, supra note 1, at 578 (“On the Internet, however, anyone armed with a computer and a modem can 
become an author, artist, and creator, as well as a reader and viewer.”); see also Lidsky, supra note 1, at 
894–95 (“The Internet gives citizens inexpensive access to a medium of mass communication and therefore 
transforms every citizen into a potential ‘publisher’ of information for First Amendment purposes.”).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting 4 The Debates in the Several 
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 571 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1876)) (“As Madison said, ‘some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; 
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.’”); see also Lidsky, supra note 1, at 893 
(“Discourse on the [Internet] boards bears more resemblance to informal gossip than to rational 
deliberation, and the culture of the boards fosters, as one commentator put it, ‘disinformation, rumors 
and garbage.’”); see also, e.g., John Intini, Look at us. Suddenly we’re all celebrities, Macleans, July 14, 
2006, available at http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=20060724_130546_130546 (“An effect 
of all this is the elevation of the completely ordinary. The clearest model may be YouTube, the video-
sharing website with the narcissistic ‘Broadcast Yourself ’ tag line, which is getting 70 million video 
views a day.”).
4. Lidsky, supra note 1, at 903 (“Some are simply responding in the only way available to prevent aggressively 
uncivil [Internet] speech, the sole purpose of which is to cause emotional and financial harm.”).
5. Rodney Smolla, Speech Overview, First Amendment Center, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/Speech/overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (“‘[F]reedom of speech’ is a value that has become 
powerfully internalized by the American polity. Freedom of speech is a core American belief, almost a 
kind of secular religious tenet, an article of constitutional faith.”).
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certain instances, such as by the firmly established doctrine of defamation.6 The 
Internet has created a new forum for defamatory commentary, producing an explosion 
of defamation claims.7 A large amount of this commentary is published anonymously 
or pseudonymously, making defamation lawsuits against Internet speakers difficult 
from the start.8 In many ways, this conflict between First Amendment rights and 
defamatory speech arises more frequently in the Internet context because of the 
freewheeling, anything-goes writing style that has developed within the fast growing 
“Internet culture,” as well as the newly adopted values and expectations of Internet 
users.9 Courts now face the difficult challenge of determining how to enforce 
6. E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances [are] not . . . within the area 
of constitutionally protected speech . . . .”); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 441 
(2009) (“The anonymity of speech, however, is not absolute and may be limited by defamation 
considerations.”); Ava v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 885 N.Y.S.2d 247, 251 (1st Dep’t 2009) (“Defamation . . . 
can take one of two forms—slander or libel. Generally speaking, slander is defamatory matter addressed 
to the ear while libel is defamatory matter addressed to the eye.”); see Ciolli, supra note 1, at 139–44 
(discussing historical development of defamation law); see also Jonathan Garret Erwin, Can Deterrence 
Play a Positive Role in Defamation Law?, 19 Rev. Litig. 675, 680–92 (2000) (providing a history of 
defamation law).
7. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1537, 1575 (2007).
Studies show that even when an Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient 
of his e-mail message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged in 
“computer mediated communication” than in other types of communications . . . . Since 
the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous speakers, it also magnifies the 
likelihood of false and abusive speech.
 Id.; Ekstrand, supra note 1, at 416 (“America Online received approximately 475 civil subpoenas in 2000 
from potential plaintiffs seeking identification of AOL users.”); Edward L. Carter, Outlaw Speech on the 
Internet: Examining the Link Between Unique Characteristics of Online Media and Criminal Libel 
Prosecutions, 21 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 289, 298–99 (2005) (noting a one-third 
increase in criminal defamation claims relating to the rise of the Internet).
8. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 7, at 1555–56 (“[T]he architecture of the Internet makes it easy to speak 
anonymously, or at least pseudonymously. As a result, there are more anonymous speakers than ever 
before using the freedom anonymity provides for both good and bad purposes.” (footnote omitted)).
9. See Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 Or. L. Rev. 117, 153 
(1996).
Cyberspaces contain their own distinct communities, with norms that transcend not 
only local or national boundaries but any kind of physical boundary at all. In another 
sense, a given cyberspace . . . may represent a different set of norms about sexually 
graphic texts. This generates “the issue of whose community rules should govern a 
cyberspace controversy.”
 Id. (citations omitted); Glenn H. Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1157, 1159–60 (2006) (discussing the peculiar nature of blog culture, specifically 
identifying general disapproval of libel suits among bloggers, a “low-trust culture” of posted information, 
and widespread self correction when a mistake is identified by another commentator); Lidsky, supra note 
1, at 863 (“The fact that many internet speakers employ online pseudonyms tends to heighten this sense 
that ‘anything goes,’ and some commentators have likened cyberspace to a frontier society free from the 
conventions and constraints that limit discourse in the real world.”); see also Indep. Newspapers, Inc. 966 
A.2d. at 438 (“Since the early 1990’s, when internet communications became available to the American 
public, anonymity or pseudonymity has been a part of the internet culture.”).
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defamation law in a manner that will not chill anonymous free speech on the Internet, 
a challenge that necessarily requires courts to become intimate with the quickly 
evolving mores of Internet culture.
 In Cohen v. Google, Inc.,10 the Supreme Court of New York, New York County, held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to an order for pre-action disclosure of an anonymous 
blogger’s identity pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 3102(c)11 
after plaintiff demonstrated that her defamation claim satisfied the court’s “meritorious 
cause of action” requirement.12 In Part II, this case comment contends that the Cohen 
court erred in concluding that the blogger’s statements were statements of fact rather 
than opinion, and thus erred in ordering the pre-action disclosure of an anonymous 
Internet speaker’s identity. In Part III, this case comment contends that the “meritorious 
cause of action” test is an improper standard for unmasking anonymous Internet 
speakers under section 3102(c) and should be abandoned by New York courts in favor 
of the three-part test announced in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1.13
 A. Background of Cohen v. Google, Inc.
 Liskula Cohen was a thirty-six-year-old model living in New York City.14 She 
led a successful modeling career and was described by the media as “a former Vogue 
cover girl.”15 On August 21, 2008, an anonymous blogger posted five messages about 
Ms. Cohen on www.blogger.com.16 Blogger.com is a website owned by Google, Inc. 
that allows users to create and publish their own blogs.17 The blogger posted these 
messages on a blog entitled “SKANKS IN NYC.”18 The postings included pictures 
of Ms. Cohen accompanied by captions describing her as: a “skank”; “skanky”; 
“psychotic, lying, whoring”; “our #1 skanky superstar”; and a “ho.”19 Some of the 
pictures depicted Ms. Cohen in a sexually suggestive manner,20 and one caption 
suggested that Ms. Cohen was experienced in performing oral sex.21
10. 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2009).
11. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(c) (McKinney 2010) (“Before an action is commenced, disclosure to aid in bringing 
an action, to preserve information or to aid in arbitration, may be obtained, but only by court order. The 
court may appoint a referee to take testimony.”).
12. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 429. 
13. 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
14. Dareh Gregorian, Ex-Vogue Model Snared in Ugly Web, N.Y. Post, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.nypost.
com/p/news/regional/ex_vogue_model_snared_in_ugly_web_aUTAquID0xeSF3RGKc6RcJ.
15. Id.
16. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
17. Id. For a definition of a blog, see infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
18. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
19. Petitioner’s Motion to Show Cause at Exhibit A, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 100012/09).
20. Id. at Exhibits A, F.
21. Petitioner’s Motion to Show Cause, Order to Show Cause in Lieu of Petition at 5, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 
424 (No. 100012/09) (“Nothing like opening wide to take that ‘thing’ into my mouth AGAIN.”).
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 Around October 9, 2008, Ms. Cohen ran a search of her name on Google.22 She 
found the blog in the search results and viewed the posted material.23 Ms. Cohen 
was “shocked and embarrassed” by the commentary, believing that the postings 
described her as “a promiscuous woman.”24 Her attorney contacted Google and asked 
the company to disclose the blogger’s identity so that Ms. Cohen could pursue a 
defamation claim.25 Google responded that it would only release the blogger’s identity 
if it was “required to do so pursuant to applicable law, regulation, legal process or 
enforceable governmental request.”26
 Ms. Cohen subsequently requested a court order for a pre-action disclosure 
pursuant to section 3102(c) directing Google to provide Ms. Cohen with information 
revealing the blogger’s identity.27 In support of her motion, Ms. Cohen produced an 
affirmation from her attorney, an affidavit from herself relating the relevant facts, 
and evidence filed under Exhibits A–F containing images and text from the blog.28 
Based on this evidence, the court ordered Google to “show cause . . . why an order 
should not be made, pursuant to section 3102(c), compelling pre-action disclosure” of 
information revealing the blogger’s identity.29 Google notified the blogger of the 
ordered proceeding.30 The blogger then appeared anonymously through counsel and 
opposed the motion.31
 B. The Cohen Court’s Legal Analysis
 The court ruled that a plaintiff is entitled to a pre-action disclosure if the plaintiff 
demonstrates that “she has a meritorious cause of action and that the information 
sought is material and necessary to the actionable wrong.”32 The court described Ms. 
Cohen’s burden as requiring “a strong showing that a cause of action exists”33 and 
that “[a]s a general rule, the adequacy of merit rests within the sound discretion of 
22. Petitioner’s Motion to Show Cause, Affidavit of Liskula Cohen in Support of Order to Show Cause 
Compelling Disclosure of Identity at 1, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 100012/09).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Petitioner’s Motion to Show Cause, Affirmation of Daniel J. Schneider in Support of Order to Show 
Cause Compelling Disclosure of Identity with Memorandum of Law at 2, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 
(No. 100012/09).
26. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425 n.1.
27. Id. at 425.
28. Affirmation in Support of Order to Show Cause Compelling Disclosure of Identity at 1–2, Cohen, 887 
N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 100012/09).
29. Order to Show Cause at 2, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 100012/09).
30. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 426 (quoting Uddin v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 810 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (1st Dep’t 2006)).
33. Id. (quoting David D. Siegel, Supplemental Practice Commentaries in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102 (McKinney 
Supp. 2000)).
338
coheN v. GooGLe, iNc.
the court.”34 To prove defamation35 in New York, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the speech in question is “a false statement, published without privilege or 
authorization to a third-party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a 
negligence standard, and, it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation 
per se.”36 Ms. Cohen argued that the blogger’s comments constituted defamation per 
se because they “impugn[ed] her chastity.”37 Further, Ms. Cohen argued that the 
blogger’s statements, particularly the use of “skank” and “ho,” were actionable 
statements of fact rather than of opinion.38 The blogger argued that the statements 
were opinion because the statements “skank” and “ho” are not capable of being proven 
true or false and the context of the statements on a blog “signal[s] readers . . . that 
what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.”39
 The court held that Ms. Cohen “sufficiently established the merits of her 
proposed cause of action for defamation . . . and that the information sought is 
material and necessary to identify the potential defendant.”40 Specifically, the court 
ruled that the words “skank” and “ho,” as used in the blogger’s commentary, 
constituted statements of fact rather than of opinion because they were capable of 
being proven true or false and, when taken in context, conveyed a sense to a reader 
that the comments were factual in nature.41
34. Id. at 427 (quoting Peters v. Southeby’s Inc., 821 N.Y.S.2d 61, 66 (1st Dep’t 2006)).
35. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
36. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 427–28 (quoting Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1st Dep’t 
1999)). When pleading a defamation claim, a plaintiff “must set forth the particular words allegedly 
constituting defamation [in the complaint] . . . , and [the complaint] must also allege the time when, 
place where, and manner in which the false statement was made, and specify to whom it was made.” 
Epifani v. Johnson, 882 N.Y.S.2d 234, 242 (2d Dep’t 2009).
37. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 426; see N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 77 (McKinney 2009) (“In an action of slander 
of a woman imputing unchastity to her, it is not necessary to allege or prove special damages.”); Sydney 
v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ’g, 242 N.Y. 208, 211–12 (1926) (“Any written or printed article is 
libelous or actionable without alleging special damages if it tends to expose the plaintiff to public 
contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking 
persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.”); Epifani, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 242–43 
(“Generally, a plaintiff alleging slander must plead and prove that he or she has sustained special 
damages, i.e., the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value. A plaintiff need not prove 
special damages, however, if he or she can establish that the alleged defamatory statement constituted 
slander per se. The four exceptions which constitute ‘slander per se’ are statements (i) charging plaintiff 
with a serious crime; (ii) that tend to injure another in his or her trade, business or profession; (iii) that 
plaintiff has a loathsome disease; or (iv) imputing unchastity to a woman. When statements fall within 
one of these categories, the law presumes that damages will result, and they need not be alleged or 
proven.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 379 (1977); James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 419 (1976) (“[W]ritten charges 
imputing unchaste conduct to a woman are libelous per se.”).
38. Affirmation of Daniel A. Schneider in Support of Order to Show Cause Compelling Disclosure of 
Identity with Memorandum of Law at 5, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 100012/09).
39. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (quoting Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 153 (1993)).
40. Id. at 427.
41. Id. at 428–29.
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 In coming to this decision, the Cohen court analyzed the blogger’s statements 
using a three-factor test established in Gross v. New York Times Co.42 According to 
Gross, a statement is one of fact rather than opinion if: (1) “the specific language in 
issue has a precise meaning which is readily understood”; (2) “the statements are 
capable of being proven true or false”; and (3) “either the full context of the 
communication in which the statement appears or the broader social context and 
surrounding circumstances . . . signal[s] . . . readers or listeners that what is being 
read or heard is likely to be” fact, not opinion.43 The court noted that the determination 
must be resolved “on the basis of what the average person hearing or reading the 
communication would take it to mean.”44 While acknowledging the broader language 
used by the blogger, such as “bitch,” the court focused the majority of its analysis on 
the words “skank” and “ho.”45
 Under the first Gross factor, the court analyzed dictionary definitions of “skank” 
and “ho” to determine that “those words on the Blog can be understood to describe 
petitioner as sexually promiscuous.”46 The court ruled on the second Gross factor that 
the statements, viewed as captions to the sexually explicit photographs, constituted 
statements that could be proven true or false.47 Under the third Gross factor, the court 
ruled that the blog’s context, consisting of statements accompanied by sexually 
provocative pictures, supported the plaintiff ’s assertion that “the thrust of the Blog is 
that petitioner is a sexually promiscuous woman.”48 The court dismissed the blogger’s 
arguments about the nature and purpose of blogs as forums of personal opinion.49 
42. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153.
43. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (quoting Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153).
44. Id. (quoting Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 290 (1986)).
45. Id. at 428–29. The court also addressed the blog’s use of the word “whoring.” Id. at 428. However, that 
term was used by the blogger as a qualifier for the word “skank.” Id. Thus, this case comment views the 
Cohen court’s analysis as focusing more heavily on the more prominently used words “ho” and “skank.” 
The blog entry using the term “whoring” in its entirety reads:
Ok so there are so many nasty bithces [sic] in the NYC scene, so now we can write 
about them. I would have to say that first place award for “Skankiest in NYC” would 
have to go to Liskula Gentile Cohen. How old is this skank? 40 something? She’s a 
psychotic, lying, whoring, still going to clubs at her age, skank. Yeah she may have been 
hot ten years ago, but is it really attractive to watch this old hag straddle dudes in a 
nightclub or lounge? Desperation seeps from her soul, if she even has one.
 Affirmation in Support of Order to Show Cause Compelling Disclosure of Identity, at Exhibit A, 
Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 100012/09). 
46. Id. at 428.
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 428–29.
49. Id. at 429. The court buttressed the dismissal by quoting dicta from the Virginia Circuit Court case In 
re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc.:
In that the Internet provides a virtually unlimited, inexpensive, and almost immediate 
means of communication with tens, if not hundreds, of millions of people, the dangers 
of its misuse cannot be ignored. . . . Those who suffer damages as a result of tortious or 
other actionable communications on the Internet should be able to seek appropriate 
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Thus, the court held the blogger’s statements constituted statements of fact rather 
than opinion.50
 As a result, the court ordered Google to reveal the blogger’s identity pursuant to 
section 3102(c).51 Google complied, unmasking the blogger as Rosemary Port, 
another model living in New York City and an acquaintance of Ms. Cohen.52 Upon 
learning Ms. Port’s identity, Ms. Cohen decided not to pursue her defamation claim, 
stating that “[t]his is about forgiveness. It adds nothing to my life to hurt hers. I wish 
her happiness.”53
ii. thE prOpEr appLiCatiOn Of thE Gross standard
 Under the Gross standard as applied by the Cohen court, Ms. Cohen was required 
to make a prima facie showing of defamation, including a showing that the blogger’s 
statements were statements of fact rather than opinion. The Cohen court should have 
held that the blogger’s statements were statements of opinion as a matter of law 
because the words “skank” and “ho” are not capable of being proven true or false and 
the context of the statements, taken as a whole, conveys to a reader that the statements 
are the blogger’s opinion rather than statements of fact.54
redress by preventing the wrongdoers from hiding behind an illusory shield of purported 
First Amendment rights.
 52 Va. Cir. 26, 34 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. Sup. Ct. 2001).
50. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
51. Id. at 429–30.
52. See Lachlan Cartwright, Rebecca Rosenburg, & Dareh Gregorian, Secret Grudge of NY ‘Skankies,’ N.Y. 
Post, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/secret_grudge_of_ny_skankies_
f6c4ttnK4zchSR51tDJoYJ.
53. Id.
54. This case comment does not directly address the court’s reasoning on the first Gross factor, which 
requires the determination of “whether the specific language in issue has a precise meaning which is 
readily understood.” Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428. The Cohen court turned to the American Heritage 
Dictionary to define the terms at issue, namely, “ho,” “whoring,” and “skank.” Id. According to that 
dictionary, ‘skank’ is defined “as ‘one who is disgustingly foul or filthy and often considered sexually 
promiscuous. Used especially of a woman or girl.’ Ho is defined as ‘slang’ for a ‘prostitute,’ and ‘whoring’ 
is defined as ‘to associate or have sexual relations with prostitutes’ or ‘to accept payment in exchange for 
sexual relations.’” Id. (quoting American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2009)). While the court turned to 
an appropriate authority for guidance on this factor, it failed to take into account the inherent differences 
between these dictionary definitions and slang usage. Other dictionaries provide alternate definitions 
for “skank”: “to dance rhythmically in a loose-limbed manner,” Skank Definition, Dictionary.com, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/skank; “‘unattractive woman,’ 1970s, from skag in this sense 
(1920s), of unknown origin,” Skank Definition, Online Etymology Dictionary available at http://
www.etymonline.com/index.php?1=s&p=33; “an ugly (young) woman,” Skank Definition, Dictionary.
com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/skank. Urban Dictionary, a user-based Internet dictionary 
that attempts to define slang words as they are currently used, boasts 134 different definitions of “ho.” 
See http://www.urbandictionary.com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). Urban Dictionary’s entries for 
“whoring” provide a common second definition of the term as “partaking in a lot of something; 
overindulging.” Id. While such information is quite pertinent to the discussion supra regarding the 
second and third Gross factors, it fails to undercut the Cohen court’s reasoning on the first factor. Because 
“the determination of whether a statement expresses fact or opinion is [a] question of law for the court 
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 A. The Improper Application of the Second Gross Factor
 The second Gross factor questions “whether the statements are capable of being 
proven true or false.”55 The court devoted one sentence to this important factor and 
cited no precedent in making its determination that the blogger’s statements satisfied 
it.56 Courts must understand the use of language “upon the temper of the times, [in] 
the current of contemporary public opinion,” and must acknowledge that “words, 
harmless in one age, in one community, may be highly damaging to reputation at 
another time or in a different place.”57 In other words, courts must adjust their rulings 
to current social mores.58 Through common use in popular media like music, 
television, and motion pictures, the once-harsh terms “skank” and “ho” have lost 
their insidious implications and been transformed into run-of-the-mill insults similar 
to “ jerk” or telling someone she “sucks.”59 Courts have held that words similar to 
on the basis of what the average person hearing or reading the communication would take it to mean,” 
the court must make its best deduction of which of these competing definitions best represents the 
community’s view on the terms at hand. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428. The court cites a well-renowned 
dictionary and applied its definitions to the terms; thus the Cohen court did not go beyond the bounds 
of reasonableness in making its determination. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1084–86 (9th Cir. 
2005) (Bea, J., dissenting). The subjective nature of this first Gross factor, as seen in the court’s ruling 
on this issue, demonstrates a major issue with current First Amendment jurisprudence: that courts are 
often forced to determine the defamatory nature of terms that are difficult to define or characterize 
because of their evolving nature as slang. See Walt Wolfram, The Truth About Change: What, Like, Makes 
Language Change?, http://www.pbs.org/speak/words/sezwho/change/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). The 
nature of such a determination demonstrates why the third Gross factor, which requires a court to 
examine the context where and how the statements were made, is extremely important in this analysis. 
See Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
55. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428. (quoting Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 153 (1993)).
56. Id.
57. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100 (1947).
58. See Ward v. Klein, 809 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2005) (“The court recognizes defendants’ 
argument that changing social mores could affect how certain sexual conduct is viewed by the community, 
and that what was defamatory per se at one time may no longer be the case.”); see also Hayes v. Smith, 832 
P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that current social mores do not favor a standard presuming 
damages when statements accuse a defamation plaintiff of homosexuality; thus, not holding statements 
accusing plaintiff of homosexuality as libel per se); Matthew B. Harrison, Old Law Applied to New Media 
Could Spell Trouble for Terrestrial Radio, Photos & The L. Blog (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.
photosandthelaw.com/2009/09/02/old-law-applied-to-new-media-could-spell-trouble-for-terrestrial-
radio; Elizabeth Soja, Unchaste no longer? The dismissal of Britney Spears’ libel lawsuit reflects the courts’ 
changing view of what can be considered defamatory, 31 The News Media & The L. 20 (2007), available at 
http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=6379 (quoting Judge Lisa Hart Cole’s order stating that 
“[t]he standard for defamatory statements is constantly changing” and quoting Professor Lisa Pruitt of the 
University of California School of Law as saying that defamation “norms certainly are shifting”).
59. See Reno v. Mellon, No. 109856/08, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1562, at *30 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2009) 
(“[E]ven if use of ‘bitch,’ ‘slut’ and ‘whore’ can be normally understood to impute unchastity to plaintiff[,] 
in this day and age when such terms are used generically,’ [sic] epithets as discussed above, the context 
of Mellon’s statements ‘negates any implication of factuality and renders those statements hyperbole or 
epithets which are exempt from action as slander.’” (quoting Saunders v. Taylor, 800 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. County 2003))). Referring to someone “sucking” is a common insult today that was an 
actionable term at the beginning of the twentieth century. See Frazier v. Grob, 183 S.W. 1083 (Mo. Ct. 
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“skank” and “ho”60 are not libelous because they are too vague and thus incapable of 
being proven true or false, including words considered far more offensive than 
“skank” or “ho” by our current social mores.61
 Perhaps the Cohen court believed, as Justice Stewart did in the case of obscenity, 
that a person knows the point when the terms “skank” and “ho” become defamatory 
“when [one] sees it.”62 While the court did not explicitly make this argument, it did 
rest its reasoning on the correlation between the posted pictures and the captions 
containing the libelous statements.63 This implies that, in the court’s view, the 
pictures amplified the nature of the text beyond the subjective realm and into that of 
App. 1916) (reversing the lower court’s ruling that defendant calling plaintiff a “cocksucker” was slander 
per se because the record was unclear whether anyone heard the speech or understood the speech as 
meaning plaintiff was guilty of the act). Today the phrases using “suck” act as vague insults comparative 
to “you are not cool” or “I do not like you.” See Nunez v. A-T Fin. Info., Inc., 957 F.Supp. 438, 440–41 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding the statement “you, you need to suck more. You need to get out your knee pads 
and start sucking” does not constitute slander per se because the statements are only insinuation); Barber 
v. Marine Drilling Mgmt., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2821, at *2, *19–22 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2002) 
(holding that a supervisor’s comments in an employee meeting that other employees could tell plaintiff 
to “suck their dick” do not rise to the level of defamatory statements); see also Soja, supra note 58 (pointing 
out that calling someone a “Communist,” or a white person “black” at one time was considered 
defamatory, and contending that courts are re-examining whether defamation per se should apply to 
situations where someone is identified as homosexual or when a woman’s chastity is called into question). 
See generally South Park: The F Word (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 4, 2009).
60. Admittedly, the Cohen court correctly notes that the term “ho” can be defined as slang for “prostitute.” 
887 N.Y.S.2d at 428. Prostitute is a defamatory term capable of being shown true or false. Id. However, 
“ho” has different meanings in different contexts and among different age groups, as exemplified in 
modern music and other media. In some contexts, the term has taken the meaning of a general insult, 
separated from its origin. This case comment does not contend that the term “ho” is not a defamatory 
term in all cases, but only when used as a loose insult as exemplified by the blog. Viewed within the 
blog’s full context, it is clear that the blogger is not accusing Ms. Cohen of prostitution; instead the term 
is used in a string of other loose, non-actionable insults. See James v. Gannett, 40 N.Y.2d 415 (1976) 
(statements in a newspaper article about a belly dancer, specifically that the plaintiff is paid to keep 
lonely men company and that “men is her business,” are not actionable because when taken in context of 
the entire article the comments obviously relate to belly dancing rather than prostitution).
61. Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 982 (N.J. 1994) (“‘Bitch’ in its common everyday use is vulgar but 
non-actionable name-calling that is incapable of objective truth or falsity.”); Seelig v. Infinity Broad. 
Corp., 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 108, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“The phrase ‘big skank’ is not actionable because 
it is too vague to be capable of being proven true or false.”); Fleming v. Kane Cnty, 636 F. Supp. 742, 
746–47 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that the terms “gutless bastard” and “black son of a bitch” were 
“offensive, and indecent” but did not constitute defamation per se).
62. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[U]nder the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall 
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that 
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I 
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” (footnote omitted)).
63. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428. The court merely states that “[a]s to the second factor, when the statements 
on the Blog are viewed in context, as captions to sexually provocative photographs of petitioner, the 
statements convey ‘facts’ that are capable of being proven true or false.” Id. This conclusory statement 
fails to explain how the pictures are able to transform the alleged defamatory terms into “facts.” It 
implies that if one sees the pictures with the words as captions, they will understand the words as 
holding a factual basis. Presumably, if the pictures did not hint at any sexual context, the court would 
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the objective, creating an unarticulated true-false test for the terms at issue.64 Without 
the pictures as visual guidance, it is unclear how the court would have proceeded in 
determining whether a person can factually or truthfully be a “skank” or a “ho.”65 
The case law supporting this position, cited in a separate portion of the opinion, is 
slim at best, and no precedent cited by the court uses the picture-text correlation to 
demonstrate whether a statement is capable of being proven true or false.66 Pictures 
should not elevate subjective insults into objective characterizations;67 nor should 
they serve to establish a “know it when I see it” test to determine when a person is in 
fact acting as a “skank” or “ho.” Instead, the pictures, like the text in the captions, 
are subjective statements controlled by the personal tastes and morals of the viewer.68 
Taken together, the captions and pictures relate a single subjective thought and do 
not morph into an objective statement capable of meeting a true-false test. Thus, the 
court should have held that the statements made on the blog were statements of 
opinion rather than fact.
 B.  The Cohen Court’s Failure to Examine the Allegedly Defamatory Statements in 
their Context of a Blog
 The third Gross factor asks “whether either the full context of the communication 
in which the statement appears or the broader social context and surrounding 
circumstances . . . signal[s] . . . readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is 
have found against Ms. Cohen on the second Gross factor. In this manner, the court avoided setting out 
a bright line test to determine when someone is in fact a “ho” or a “skank.” Id.
64. See Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428; see also Harrison, supra note 58 (“To my surprise, the court also 
determined that these statements (as captions to photographs) could be proven true or false. While I am 
not familiar with a true/false test that determines whether someone is a skank or ho . . . the court 
obviously believes that one exists.”).
65. See supra note 63.
66. The Cohen court relies on Regent v. Liberation Publications, Inc., 611 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st Dep’t 1994). In 
Regent, the court held the word “lust,” placed in a picture advertisement and when taken in context of 
other sexually suggestive advertisements in a magazine catering to the homosexual community, was 
defamatory because it “carries a negative overtone of sexual promiscuity.” Id. at 243. The court did not 
examine whether the language accompanying the sexually charged advertisement containing plaintiff ’s 
image could be proven true or false. The blog allegedly defaming Ms. Cohen contained no advertisements. 
Further, posts on a blog carry much different connotations than text within a magazine that states an 
intention to cater to a sexually liberal homosexual community. Thus, Regent is distinguishable from 
Cohen. See also Ava v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 885 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1st Dep’t 2009) (distinguishing Regent by 
pointing to the purpose and expectations of the medium in question, specifically comparing a magazine 
catering to a sexually liberal audience to a daily newspaper, and the use of defamatory material in sexual 
advertisements compared to the use of information and pictures in a newspaper article).
67. Knievel v. ESPN, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Mont. 2002) (holding that a picture of plaintiff with 
his arms around two women accompanied by a caption identifying plaintiff as a pimp was not defamatory 
because no one would reasonably believe the picture asserted that plaintiff was actually engaged in 
prostitution).
68. See Byrd v. Hustler Mag., 433 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“When words and pictures are 
presented together, each is an important element of what, in toto, constitutes the publication. Articles 
are to be considered with their illustrations; pictures are to be viewed with their captions.”).
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likely to be opinion, not fact.”69 The Cohen court ruled that the blog’s context relates 
to sexual promiscuity because it uses words with “sexual overtones” in the captions 
and in the blog’s title.70 The opinion dismissed the blogger’s arguments regarding the 
purposes and expectations of blogs on the Internet.71 This dismissal was in error, as 
the court failed to take into account the particular medium in which these comments 
were published, readers’ perceptions and expectations of anonymous blogs, the overall 
tone of the blog in question, and the low potential for true injury to Ms. Cohen’s 
reputation. 72
 According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, a “blog” is “a Web site that 
contains an online personal journal with reflections, comments, and often hyperlinks 
provided by the writer.”73 Dictionary.com defines a “blog” as “an online diary; a personal 
chronological log of thoughts published on a Web page.”74 Most courts would not 
consider writings from diaries and personal journals libelous in traditional print form, 
as these writings are rarely read by the public.75 The Cohen court correctly identified an 
important difference: blogs are intended and made available for public consumption on 
the Internet, while diaries are not.76 But perhaps a better analogy can be made between 
bloggers and opinionated personalities on radio and television. Indeed, it is difficult to 
discern how the most entertaining or offensive blogs are any different from bombastic 
radio and television personalities who are protected under the exemption for statements 
of opinion.77 If blogs are not well protected as forums of opinion, the broadcast industry, 
with its increasing use of opinion-based news programs, could become more susceptible 
69. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (quoting Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 153 (1993)).
70. Id. at 429.
71. Id.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 88–90.
73. Blog Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blog (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2010).
74. Blog Definition, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/blog (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
75. See Mills v. Miteq, Inc., No. 06-CV-0752-SJF-AKT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9209, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 7, 2008) (“The excerpts from Defendant[’s] . . . diary cannot support a defamation claim because 
Plaintiff has not identified a person to whom these statements were published . . . .”).
76. See Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (quoting In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 
26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)).
77. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (ruling that after radio host disparaged a 
company and advised listeners not to purchase its products because the company “sucks,” “[b]ased on the 
‘totality of the circumstances’ test, Martino’s reliance on the facts as recited by Feroglia was reasonable 
and the specific context of the radio broadcast indicates that Martino was expressing his opinion and 
not a factual assertion”); see also Harrison, supra note 58 (“While it has never been assumed that talk 
radio is inherently opinion-based, it certainly was a de facto starting point. What happens now that the 
precedent is that statements on the internet, which seem to be full of opinion, are to be taken as 
statement of fact? What about for talk radio-something that is less obviously opinion (than the 
internet)?”); Imus called women’s basketball team ‘nappy-headed hos’, Media Matters for Am., (April 4, 
2007, 6:00 PM), http://mediamatters.org/research/200704040011 (“[H]ost Don Imus referred to the 
Rutgers University women’s basketball team . . . as ‘nappy-headed hos’ immediately after the show’s 
executive producer, Bernard McGuirk, called the team ‘hard-core hos.’”).
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to defamation claims similar to that brought by Ms. Cohen as well.78 The court’s 
reasoning that a public, online, personal journal contains statements of fact rather than 
opinion could potentially extend beyond blogs and the Internet into other traditionally 
protected forms of speech.79 If given broad acceptance, these arguments may have a 
significant chilling effect beyond the Internet in areas such as talk radio and opinion-
based television programs.80
 Information available on the Internet, particularly within blogs, has yet to 
establish itself as authoritative within scholarly circles.81 Scholarly papers avoid 
citations to websites because of the ease in which the information on the website may 
change or be deleted entirely.82 Wikipedia, the popular user-edited online 
encyclopedia, provides a wealth of information but is not considered trustworthy; the 
academic establishment, while praising the novel method of information accumulation, 
shuns its use as a source of information in scholarly works.83 This stigma magnifies 
78. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Brian Stetler, Fox’s Volley with 
Obama Administration Intensifying, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 2009, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/
business/media/12fox.html (noting the increased use of opinionated programs on Fox News). 
79. See Harrison, supra note 58 (“With the broader interpretations being applied tightly to new media, and 
then being applied to terrestrial media—it is necessary to be aware of this additional exposure to 
potential liability.”).
80. Lidsky, supra note 1, at 888. (“[T]he chilling effect occurs when defamation law encourages prospective 
speakers to engage in undue self-censorship to avoid the negative consequences of speaking.”).
81. Nicole A. Stafford, Lose the Distinction: Internet Bloggers and First Amendment Protection of Libel Defendants—
Citizen Journalism and the Supreme Court’s Murky Jurisprudence Blur the Line Between Media and Non-Media 
Speakers, 84 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 597, 600 (2007) (“Web blogs have yet to obtain the status of the 
mainstream media as authoritative sources of accurate and balanced news and information.”); Transcription 
Resources: Evaluating & Citing Online Resources, Transcriptions, http://transcriptions.english.ucsb.edu/
resources/guides/learning/evaluating_citing.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2010) (“The unfiltered and unstable 
nature of information found on the Web makes the evaluation of online resources a necessity.”).
82. The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 18, at 151 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. 
eds., 18th ed. 2005) (“Sources in [electronic media and other nonprint resources] pose special problems 
because they often lack the permanence and authoritativeness of traditional printed material.”).
83. See Neil L. Waters, Why You Can’t Cite Wikipedia in My Class, 50 Comm. ACM 15, 15–17 (Sept. 2007); 
see also Campbell v. Sec’y of HHS, 69 Fed. Cl. 775 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (stating that Wikipedia articles 
“culled from the Internet do not – at least on their face – remotely meet this reliability requirement.” 
The court identified five reasons why Wikipedia is not an appropriate source. The court further 
expressed doubt about information from other websites, such as www.webmd.com and www.iowahealth.
com); Reporting from the Internet, Reuters, Handbook of Journalism (Mar. 12, 2010, 7:10 AM), 
http://handbook.reuters.com/index.php/Reporting_from_the_internet.
Online information sources which rely on collaborative, voluntary and often anonymous 
contributions need to be handled with care. Wikipedia, the online “people’s 
encyclopedia,” can be a good starting point for research, but it should not be used as an 
attributable source. Do not quote from it or copy from it. The information it contains 
has not been validated and can change from second to second as contributors add or 
remove material. Move on to official websites or other sources that are worthy of 
attribution. Do not link to Wikipedia or similar collaborative encyclopedia sites as a 
source of background information on any topic.
 Id.
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when anonymously or pseudonymously authored blogs are concerned.84 While a 
number of blogs have established themselves as authorities in certain professional 
areas,85 many blogs contain the rantings of average people looking to let off steam.86 
As a result, readers take such blogs, especially those with anonymous or pseudonymous 
authors, with a grain of salt; they mainly read such blogs for entertainment and 
sensationalism rather than for serious, authoritative accounts of the world.87 The 
large number of blogs in existence on the Internet further minimizes the likelihood 
of Ms. Cohen receiving true injury,88 especially considering that the blog lacked 
advertising89 and was rarely visited.90
84. See Lidsky & Cotters, supra note 7, at 1597 (quoting Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005)) (“[R]eaders 
take their cues from context and ‘are unlikely to view messages posted anonymously as assertions of 
fact,’ especially when they appear on websites filled with invective and hyperbole.”); see also Lidsky, 
supra note 1, at 898 (“If the speech of anonymous John Does in cyberspace fosters the search for truth, 
it is largely by accident.”).
85. These blogs are almost exclusively attributable to identified authors considered experts in their fields. A 
quick examination of legal blogs shows an increasing particularity, with editorial writing focused on 
extremely niche markets. See Internet Defamation L. Blog, http://www.Internetdefamationlawblog.
com (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (providing legal analysis on the narrow topic of defamation on the 
Internet); SCOTUSblog.com, www.scotusblog.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (established blog 
providing insight to recent Supreme Court arguments and decisions); Law Memo, www.lawmemo.com 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (providing legal analysis for a broad range of legal topics); Workplace Prof 
Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/ (providing legal analysis focused on labor and 
employment issues).
86. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that within Internet discussions, 
“[h]yperbole and exaggeration are common, and ‘venting’ is at least as common as careful and considered 
argumentation.” (quoting Lidsky, supra note 1, at 863)); Ciolli, supra note 1, at 252 (“The majority of 
diary bloggers view their blogs as a release, or a way to vent about their problems.”); Paul S. Gutman, 
Say What? Blogging and Employment Law in Conflict, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 145, 146 (2003) (“While 
many bloggers still link to sites that inspire their admiration or anger and which they want others to see, 
the pithy statements have become full sentences and paragraphs of outspoken criticism or praise. Some 
bloggers make no reference to other websites and use their blogs simply as diaries—as venues for 
pontificating on a variety of topics. Others entertain hopes of becoming writers. Many others pick a 
single topic and maintain a running commentary on its evolving state.”).
87. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 1159 (“The blogosphere, like the Internet as a whole, is a low-trust 
culture.”).
88. According to Technorati.com, a website dedicated to discerning trends within the blogging community, 
at least 133 million blogs exist on the Internet, and almost one million blogs are created every day. 
Phillip Winn, State of the Blogosphere: Introduction, Technorati (Aug. 21, 2009, 7:38 PM), http://
technorati.com/blogging/article/state-of-the-blogosphere-introduction/.
89. See Petitioner’s Motion to Show Cause at Exhibits A & B, Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2009) (No. 100012/09). The record reveals that the blog did not include 
advertisements or endorsements on October 8, 2008. Links and advertisements boost a website’s 
popularity in Internet searches; without their help, a webpage will likely become lost in the shuff le. Link 
Value Factors, Wiep.net, http://wiep.net/link-value-factors/LinkValueFactors.pdf.
90. Petitioner’s Motion to Show Cause at Exhibit B, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 100012/09) (asserting 
that comments posted on the blog by “liveandlove” state that through October 8, 2008, only twenty 
Internet users visited the Blog).
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 The blog’s tone is another important factor missing in the Cohen court’s analysis. 
A number of the blogger’s comments were written as interrogatories.91 Such comments 
do not create a sense that the blogger knows more about Ms. Cohen than the reader; 
instead the comments are couched in a need for validation and affirmation by asking 
the reader to comment further on Ms. Cohen’s personality.92 The frequent use of 
interrogatories creates a tone in which the other comments are read, as if each 
sentence is followed by “Do you agree?” Courts should not take such commentary as 
statements of fact, as its structure and content belies the author’s need for the 
information’s validation.
 Thus, the blog’s context is more expansive than the Cohen court’s narrow 
examination of its captions and pictures. The “broad social context” of the blog 
reveals that the blogger published her statements as part of a personal online journal, 
which was penned anonymously, labeled under a sensational title, rarely visited, 
unadvertised and without endorsement, seeking validation of its perspective, and 
published in a medium well-known for providing unreliable opinions.93 Viewed in 
this light, it is difficult to understand how a court might believe the blogger’s 
statements—in the eyes of a reasonable Internet user—constituted statements of fact 
rather than opinion.94 The Cohen court’s lax application of the Gross standard and its 
outright refusal to examine blogs as a unique medium creates worry among bloggers 
speaking anonymously, pseudonymously, or otherwise, many of whom are indeed 
worthy of protection.95
91. Of the twelve sentences penned by the blogger, four of them inquire whether the reader agrees with the 
blogger’s opinion. See Petitioner’s Motion to Show Cause at Exhibit A, Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (No. 
100012/09). The cited sentences read as follows: (1) “Don’t you guys think she should grow and an [sic] 
get on with her life?”; (2) “What kind of guy wants a skank bitch like that?”; (3) “How old is this skank? 
40 something?”; (4) “Yeah she may have been hot 10 years ago, but is it really attractive to watch this old 
hag straddle dudes in a nightclub or lounge?” Id.
92. See Pub. Relations Soc’y of Am., Inc. v. Road Runner High Speed Online, 799 N.Y.S.2d 847 (2005) (noting 
that actionable “mixed-opinion” statements imply that the writer knows facts unknown to the reader, while 
“pure opinion” statements are not actionable when they do not imply a basis in undisclosed facts).
93. See supra notes 74–76, 79–82, and accompanying text; Reynolds, supra note 9, at 1159 (“Most bloggers 
focus on opinion . . . .”). See generally Lidsky, supra note 1, at 931 (“Judge Harry T. Edwards . . . apologized 
for giving insufficient consideration to the fact that the allegedly defamatory statements had ‘appeared 
in the context of a book review, a genre in which readers expect to find spirited critiques of literary 
works . . . .’” (quoting Moldea II v. N.Y. Times, Co., 22 F.3d 310, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The court in 
Moldea II upheld the lower court’s decision by ruling in favor of the defendant newspaper. Moldea II, 22 
F.3d at 311.
94. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 1165 (arguing that because of the low-trust culture of blogs, it is unlikely 
that someone will “change an opinion of another person, famous or obscure, solely because of something 
read on a blog”); James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 420 (1976) (“It is the duty of the court, in an 
action for libel, to understand the publication in the same manner that others would naturally do.”).
95. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“The decision in favor of 
anonymity may be motivated by fear, of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social 
ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.” (quoting McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995))). See generally James Temple, Skank Case Precedent 
Worries Privacy Groups, The Tech Chronicles, S.F. Chron. (Aug. 20, 2009, 4:10 PM) http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/techchron/detail?&entry_id=45920.
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iii. appLYing a baLanCEd standard tO anOnYMOUs intErnEt spEECh
 In the past five years, the Supreme Court of New York has used three separate tests 
to determine when pre-action disclosure pursuant to section 3102(c) is appropriate to 
unmask potentially tortious anonymous and pseudonymous Internet speakers.96 It is 
imperative that New York establish a uniform standard to end uncertainty over the right 
of anonymous and pseudonymous Internet speakers to preserve their anonymity.97 
Courts across the country are individually attempting to fashion a standard that protects 
both the well-established First Amendment right to speak anonymously98 and the rights 
96. While only three courts have actually ruled on the issue, the problem of uncertainty within New York 
jurisdictions is broader than this number suggests. Over the past six years, New York State and Second 
Circuit courts have addressed the pre-action disclosure of Internet speakers’ identities six times, 
contemplating five different standards. See Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 424; supra notes 32–34 and 
accompanying text. In Public Relations Society of America, Inc. v. Road Runner High Speed Online, the 
court applied the “meritorious cause of action” standard plus a five-factor test, examining: “(1) whether 
the claimant has shown a prima facie cause of actionable harm, (2) whether the discovery request was 
sufficiently specific as to be reasonable likely to lead to the identifying information, (3) whether there 
was an alternative means to obtain the information, (4) if the information sought was central and 
necessary to advance the claim, and (5) if the defendant had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
identifying information.” 799 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2005). In Ottinger v. Non-Party 
The Journal News, the court required that a plaintiff (1) provide defendants with timely notice of the 
proceeding on the Internet forums containing the alleged defamatory material; (2) establish a prima 
facie claim of all elements within the plaintiff ’s control; and (3) demonstrate the strength of the prima 
facie case and the necessity for disclosure outweighs defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous 
free speech. 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4579 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 2008). In Greenbaum v. 
Google, Inc., the court held that plaintiff did not set forth a prima facie defamation claim because the 
statements posted on an Internet site were protected opinion. The court spoke favorably of using a 
balancing test to protect the First Amendment rights of Internet speakers, but declined to apply the test 
because the court did not reach the issue. 845 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2008). In Sony Music 
Entertainment Inc. v. Does 1–40, the court established and applied the test borrowed by the court in 
Public Relations Society. 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Finally, in Doe I v. Individuals, the court 
established a six-part test, requiring a court to consider (1) whether the anonymous posters were notified 
of the proceeding; (2) “whether the plaintiff has identified and set forth the exact statements purportedly 
made by each anonymous poster that the plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech”; (3) “the 
specificity of the discovery request and whether there is an alternative means of obtaining the information 
called for in the subpoena”; (4) “whether there is a central need for the subpoenaed information to 
advance the plaintiffs’ claims”; (5) “the subpoenaed party’s expectation of privacy at the time the online 
material was posted”; and (6) whether the plaintiffs made “a concrete showing as to each element of a 
prima facie case against the defendant.” 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254–56 (D. Conn. 2008).
97. See Anthony Ciolli, Technology Policy, Internet Privacy, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 Yale 
J.L. & Tech. 176, 184 (2008) (“[T]he lack of a uniform standard creates unpredictability. In most 
jurisdictions, it remains a mystery which test a court will apply to determine whether a civil subpoena 
may be used to unmask an anonymous speaker.”); Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe: 
How Far Should First Amendment Protection of Anonymous Speakers Extend?, 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 
421, 443 (2007) (“Lack of uniformity in determining when to unmask anonymous internet speakers is 
creating problems in lower courts. No one standard appears to be winning favor, and each jurisdiction 
that takes up the issue is putting its own stamp on the problem.”). See generally Nathaniel Gleicher, 
Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 Yale L.J. 320, 325 (2008) (arguing 
for a nationwide standard, stating that “[o]nly a consistent nationwide standard for John Doe subpoenas 
will ensure balanced protection for both anonymous online speakers and the targets of anonymous 
online speech”).
98. See infra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
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of those injured through unregulated Internet speech.99 This case comment contends 
that New York should, in cases where tort claims100 are brought against anonymous 
Internet speakers, abandon the “meritorious cause of action” standard for pre-action 
disclosure and adopt the three-factor test announced in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1.101
 A. The Mobilisa Standard
 In Mobilisa, the plaintiff brought an action for trespass of chattel and violations 
of two federal statutes.102 In this case, an anonymous sender distributed an e-mail 
written by the chief executive officer of Mobilisa, Inc., to a large number of people, 
including members of the Mobilisa management team.103 The e-mail, originally sent 
to a non-employee of Mobilisa, related intimate details of a romantic nature regarding 
the chief executive officer’s relationship with the intended recipient, and included the 
subject line, “Is this a company you want to work for?”104 The plaintiff requested that 
the court order a pre-action disclosure to identify the anonymous sender.105 The 
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.106
99. See Gleicher, supra note 97, at 325. (“No fewer than seven different cases have expressed distinct 
standards over the past nine years. These standards vary widely, making the extent of the right to 
anonymous speech online uncertain.” (citing Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001))); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Mobilisa, Inc. v. 
Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinksy v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 
(Va. 2001); see also Ciolli, supra note 97, at 176–77 (stating that “courts have reached widely divergent 
results” in fashioning tests to determine when a court should unmask an anonymous Internet speaker). 
100. This case comment does not go so far as to suggest applying the Mobilisa standard to criminal or civil 
rights actions, which raise significantly different issues. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (reversing a jury verdict that found the defendant had violated a federal statute which 
prohibits “accessing a computer involved in interstate or foreign communication without authorization 
or in excess of authorization to obtain information,” on charges that arose from cyberbullying and ended 
in the suicide of a thirteen-year-old girl); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61 
(2009) (pointing out a rise in civil liberties and civil rights violations committed by “online mobs” and 
the need for legal remedies to prevent off line prejudice against traditionally disadvantaged classes from 
prohibiting the fair and equal use of the Internet).
101. 170 P.3d 715 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
102. Id. at 715–16. The claims were brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2701 (2000).
103. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 715.
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 716. The Arizona Superior Court adopted the “summary judgment standard” from Doe v. Cahill. 
884 A.2d 451, 460–61 (Del. 2005). Under this standard, a court may order a pre-action disclosure of an 
anonymous Internet speaker’s identity if: “(1) the requesting party makes reasonable efforts to notify the 
anonymous speaker of the discovery request and that person is afforded a reasonable time to respond, 
and (2) the requesting party demonstrates its cause of action would survive a motion for summary 
judgment.” See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 716 (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61). 
106. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 727.
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 On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals set a new standard for pre-action 
disclosure of anonymous and pseudonymous Internet speakers’ identities in 
Arizona.107 The court held that:
to obtain a court order compelling discovery of an anonymous Internet speaker’s 
identity, the requesting party must show that: (1) the speaker has been given adequate 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the discovery request, (2) the 
requesting party’s cause of action could survive a motion for summary judgment on 
the elements of the claim not dependent on the identity of the anonymous speaker, 
and (3) a balance of the parties’ competing interests favors disclosure.108
This case comment will address each of these factors in turn.
 B. The Notice Requirement
 The New York standard should require that the anonymous or pseudonymous 
Internet speaker receive notice of any court action to unmask her and receive “a 
reasonable opportunity to respond.”109 Courts tend to include a notice requirement 
more often than not when fashioning new standards for pre-action disclosure of 
anonymous Internet speakers.110 This factor ensures that an anonymous Internet 
speaker is aware of her potential liability and allows the speaker time to produce an 
adequate legal defense to the court action.111 Without a notice requirement, courts 
can order the unmasking of anonymous and pseudonymous Internet speakers without 
hearing any argument about why the speech in question should be protected.112 In 
order to avoid unduly burdening plaintiffs, the appropriate standard should only 
require a plaintiff to post the notice on the same Internet forum where the defendant 
posted the alleged defamatory statements.113 In situations where a notice posting is 
impossible, the court should require the involved Internet company to send the 
anonymous speaker notice via e-mail.
107. Id. at 715, 724.
108. Id. at 721.
109. See id. at 719.
110. See Gleicher, supra note 97, at 345 (“Although [the notice requirement] is becoming a more common 
occurrence, it is certainly not universal.”). Of the seven cases identified by Gleicher in note 99, four 
include a notice requirement. Id. at 344; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 719 (“Mobilisa does not challenge 
the requirement set forth in both Cahill and Dendrite that the requesting party show the anonymous 
speaker has been given adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the discovery 
request.”(emphasis added)).
111. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 7, at 1598.
112. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (“The notification provision imposes very little burden on a defamation 
plaintiff while at the same time giving an anonymous defendant the opportunity to respond. When 
First Amendment interests are at stake we disfavor ex parte discovery requests that afford the plaintiff the 
important form of relief that comes from unmasking an anonymous defendant.”).
113. Id.; see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 7, at 1598 (“It is reasonable to require the plaintiff to post notice 
on the same website, blog, chat room, or other forum where the defendant’s allegedly tortious 
communication was made.”).
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 C. The Required Standard of Proof
 New York courts should also require the plaintiff to demonstrate she possesses a 
reasonable chance of recovery. Almost every court addressing this issue requires some 
showing of a potential cause of action by the plaintiff before ordering the pre-action 
disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker’s identity.114 However, courts differ on 
the required showing.115 The Cohen court’s “meritorious cause of action” standard 
requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of a cause of action before it will 
issue a court order for a pre-action disclosure.116 This standard is stronger than that 
applied by some courts, placing the plaintiff ’s burden of proof somewhere between a 
motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment standard.117 Yet the 
“meritorious cause of action” standard breeds ambiguity,118 and thus is too weak and 
114. Gleicher, supra note 97, at 350 (“[T]he strength of the plaintiff ’s claim . . . is the most commonly 
included element in John Doe subpoena standards.”). Of the seven cases identified by Gleicher, only one 
does not include a strength of showing requirement. See supra note 99.
115. Other standards employed by courts include: the “good faith” standard, see In re Subpoena Duces Tecum 
to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000); the “motion to dismiss” standard, see 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999); the “evidentiary showing 
of a prima facie case” standard, see Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001); the “meritorious cause of action” standard, see Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 
424, 426 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2009), supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text; and the “summary 
judgment” standard, see Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
116. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 426. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text; see also Holzman v. 
Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 707 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160–61 (1st Dep’t 2000) 
(“Pre-action discovery . . . cannot be used by a prospective plaintiff to ascertain whether he has a cause 
of action at all.”); In re Stewart v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 492 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (2d Dep’t 1985) (“Where, 
however, the facts alleged state a cause of action, the protection of a party’s affairs is no longer the 
primary consideration and an examination to determine the identities of the parties and what form or 
forms the action should take is appropriate.” (quoting In re Houlihan-Parnes, Realtors, 395 N.Y.S.2d 
684 (2d Dep’t 1977))); Gleich v. Kissinger, 489 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (1st Dep’t 1985) (“[P]reaction 
disclosure . . . to aid in bringing an action, under CPLR 3102(subd[c]), is granted only where the party 
seeking the disclosure has shown in his affidavits facts which fairly indicate he has some cause of action 
against the adverse party and, further, that the information he seeks is ‘material and necessary’ to that 
actionable wrong.”).
117. The Cohen court compared the requirement in Dendrite International that a plaintiff “produce sufficient 
evidence supporting each element of its cause of action on a prima facie basis” to the “meritorious cause 
of action standard.” Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 427 n.5. The Cohen court stated that the “meritorious cause 
of action standard” was sufficient “to address the constitutional concerns raised in this context.” Id. 
Both standards require that a plaintiff adduce some evidentiary showing of a prima facie claim. See 
Dendrite Int’ l, 775 A.2d at 760; see also In re Stump v. 209 E. 56th St. Corp., 622 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1st Dep’t 
1995).
118. It is clear that New York’s “meritorious cause of action” standard requires a plaintiff to adduce some type 
of evidence of a prima facie claim. Yet courts do not provide guidance as to the required strength of that 
evidence. The case-by-case analysis employed under this standard results in the application of both 
strict and permissive standards. Compare Stewart v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 163 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (3d 
Dep’t 1957) (“The party seeking the examination ought to disclose under oath facts which will fairly 
indicate he has some cause of action against the adverse party. He need not, of course, either name it 
correctly or state it with technical precision, but as a matter of judicial policy he ought to be required to 
show, within the frame of rule 122 of the Rules of Civil Practice that the examination he seeks is 
‘material’ and ‘necessary’ to some actionable wrong.”), and Stewart v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 492 N.Y.S.2d 
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unpredictable to properly protect the rights of both anonymous Internet speakers and 
Internet tort plaintiffs.119 As noted in Mobilisa, similar prima facie standards “set the 
bar too low, chilling potential speakers from speaking anonymously on the Internet.”120 
Weak standards allow plaintiffs to, in bad faith, obtain orders unmasking anonymous 
Internet speakers in situations where they are unlikely to succeed on a cause of 
action.121 This grants powerful plaintiffs the ability to silence and retaliate against 
anonymous Internet critics by compelling Internet companies to divulge their 
identities.122 A summary judgment standard, as set forth in Mobilisa, would end 
ambiguity in New York courts by clearly stating the evidentiary requirements 
expected by the court. Further, such a standard would properly protect anonymous 
Internet speech while also providing plaintiffs with good faith defamation claims the 
opportunity to recover their losses.123
459, 60 (2d Dep’t 1985) (requiring that “the facts alleged state a cause of action” for plaintiff to succeed 
on his pre-action disclosure motion), with Ero v. Graystone Materials, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708–09 
(3d Dep’t 1998) (requiring that a petitioner demonstrate a prima facie case, and that the “documents 
submitted to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie cause of action” are “based on first-hand 
knowledge,” and borrowing language from McCummings v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 81 N.Y.2d 923, 926 
(1993), which discussed a movant’s burden on a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) under 
New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules section 4404(a), arguably a more difficult standard to 
overcome than a summary judgment standard), and Toal v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 752 N.Y.S.2d 372 
(2d Dep’t 2002) (following Ero’s strict standard, denying petitioner’s motion for pre-action disclosure 
after providing affidavits and an affirmation because the evidence lacked an affirmation or affidavit 
from a medical expert, a requirement to succeed on a motion for summary judgment). Toal is exemplary 
of the ambiguity and uncertainty issues, as the court departed from Second Department precedent in 
this ruling by applying Ero’s analysis, a Third Department case. Thus, the plaintiff in Toal was left in 
the dark about what strength of evidentiary showing the court expected. The use of a summary judgment 
standard would end this ambiguity and allow courts to rest their decisions on a set evidentiary standard. 
See also Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2009) (Adkins, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
majority is not clear whether or not a plaintiff must make this prima facie showing by an affidavit, 
deposition, or other statement under oath, or whether mere allegations of fact are sufficient. . . . [T]he 
Bar and the Bench would be better served if the majority would clarify this point.”).
119. See Ciolli, supra note 97, at 185 (“When fundamental First Amendment and privacy rights are at stake, 
consistent decision making among the federal courts is needed.”); Gleicher, supra note 97, at 353 (“Prima 
facie standards do vary . . . across substantive claims (a prima facie showing of libel is different from a 
prima facie showing of trademark infringement).”).
120. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
121. See Jones, supra note 97, at 429 (“After obtaining the identity of an anonymous critic through the 
compulsory discovery process, a defamation plaintiff who either loses on the merits or fails to pursue a 
lawsuit is still free to engage in extra-judicial self-help remedies; more bluntly, the plaintiff can simply 
seek revenge or retribution.”); Lidsky, supra note 1, at 876–77 (Lidsky points out that corporations often 
use Internet defamation lawsuits as part of public relations campaigns, believing that while they will not 
recover economically from an Internet John Doe, other economic reasons make it “rational to sue the 
pseudonymous posters.”).
122. See Jones, supra note 97, at 429.
123. Gleicher, supra note 97, at 352 (“This [summary judgment] standard provides a more specific, measurable 
level of protection for defendants.”).
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 Critics argue that the summary judgment standard places too great a burden on 
the plaintiff.124 Professor Elizabeth Malloy contends that this standard requires a 
plaintiff to prove her claim before even obtaining the defendant’s identity, thereby 
preventing plaintiffs with good faith claims from obtaining the facts required to 
draft a well-pleaded complaint.125 This argument fails for two reasons: the nature of 
the tort claims at issue and the actual burden placed on the plaintiff. The information 
required to demonstrate a defamation claim for the purposes of summary judgment 
lies at the plaintiff ’s fingertips. The exact wording of the statement about the 
plaintiff, the context in which it was made, the nature of the comments, and the 
ability to show the statements are false are all within the plaintiff ’s possession from 
her first notice of the statement.126 While the discovery process may lead the plaintiff 
to a more exact understanding of a plaintiff ’s injury, or in some cases evidence 
demonstrating malice by the defendant,127 the Mobilisa standard does not require a 
plaintiff to demonstrate any facts that can only be obtained through knowledge of 
the speaker’s identity.128
 The purpose of bringing these sorts of defamation claims is not monetary 
recovery;129 anonymous speakers are usually not deep pockets.130 Instead, these cases 
124. See S. Elizabeth Malloy, Bloggership: How Blogs Are Transforming Legal Scholarship: Anonymous Bloggers 
and Defamation: Balancing Interests on the Internet, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1187, 1190–92 (2006); Michael 
S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing Over Legal 
Standards, 83 Or. L. Rev. 795, 810 (2004) (arguing that a heightened standard makes it difficult for 
plaintiffs to determine whether litigation would be financially worthwhile); see also Daniel J. Solove, A 
Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1195, 1200 (2006) 
(“[Speech and privacy] are certainly serious problems, but the solution shouldn’t be to insulate bloggers 
from the law.”).
125. Malloy, supra note 124, at 1190–93.
126. In New York, “§ 3016(a) requires that in a defamation action, ‘the particular words complained of . . . be 
set forth in the complaint.’ The complaint also must allege the time, place and manner of the false 
statement and specify to whom it was made.” Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1st Dep’t 
1999) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(a) (2009)). Because the court will not require a plaintiff to demonstrate 
information dependant on the defendant’s identity, these pleading requirements will not unduly burden a 
plaintiff attempting to bring a defamation claim. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
127. See In re Gleich v. Kissinger, 489 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1st Dep’t 1985) (holding that a petition for pre-action 
disclosure under the “meritorious cause of action” standard failed because petitioner, a public figure, did 
not produce evidence of malice). The Mobilisa standard avoids this problem by not requiring a plaintiff 
to demonstrate information that is dependent on the defendant’s identity. 170 P.3d at 719.
128. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720 (“We . . . require the requesting party to demonstrate it would survive a motion 
for summary judgment filed by Doe on all of the elements within the requesting party’s control—in other 
words, all elements not dependent upon knowing the identity of the anonymous speaker.”); see also Ciolli, 
supra note 97, at 187 (stating that the test “considers the strength of the plaintiff ’s case at an earlier stage in 
the proceedings than is typical—however, this is balanced by plaintiffs not having to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on issues that are dependent on the speaker’s identity”).
129. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 872 (“[T]he sudden surge in John Doe suits stems from the fact that many 
defamation actions are not really about money.”).
130. In 1996, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which, “as interpreted,” by 
the courts “gives [Internet Service Providers] complete immunity from liability for defamatory content 
initiated by third parties, even if the ISP consciously decides to republish the defamatory content.” 
354
coheN v. GooGLe, iNc.
are generally brought to silence Internet speech or to identify whistleblowers for 
intimidation and retaliation purposes.131 Thus, worries about a heightened standard 
are ill-founded, as the courts will only require a plaintiff to produce evidence that she 
can easily obtain.132 Further, this standard will require plaintiffs to demonstrate the 
merits of their claim; by doing so, the standard will prevent intimidation by powerful 
plaintiffs without good-faith causes of action who are attempting to unmask and 
silence pesky Internet speakers.
 D. The Balancing Test Requirement
 Finally, the New York standard should include a balancing test. It is well settled 
that offensive opinions and rhetorical hyperbole are protected forms of speech under 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.133 The New York State Constitution 
is more expansive, offering broader free speech protections for opinion and rhetorical 
hyperbole than the U.S. Constitution.134 The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that 
Lidsky, supra note 1, at 871. This statute left “defamation victims with no deep pocket to sue.” Id. at 
872. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 1158 (“Most bloggers aren’t as impecunious as The Homeless Guy, 
but few make tempting financial targets.”).
131. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720 (“Requiring the requesting party to satisfy [a summary judgment standard] 
furthers the goal of compelling identification of anonymous Internet speakers only as a means to redress 
legitimate misuses of speech rather than as a means to retaliate against or chill legitimate uses of speech.”). 
Lidsky, supra note 1, at 860, 877 (“[T]he goals of this new breed of libel action are largely symbolic, the 
primary goal being to silence John Doe and others like him. . . . Although corporations that sue John Doe 
may never recover money damages, they may still deem it economically rational to sue the pseudonymous 
posters who make negative statements about them on financial message boards.”); Ekstrand, supra note 1, 
at 408–09 (“In libel cases especially, some plaintiffs, upset by critical but not necessarily illegal actions of 
an anonymous author, seek to unmask online users simply to stop the criticism.”).
132. See Ciolli, supra note 97, at 179 (explaining that “[a]ny standard other than the highest level of scrutiny 
thus fundamentally jeopardizes ‘the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas’ that ‘Internet 
anonymity facilitates’”).
133. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of 
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—
are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”); see Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 
(1988); Old Dominion Branch v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974).
134. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge 
the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may 
be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is 
true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the 
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.”); see Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 
N.Y.2d 235, 249 (1991) (stating that the New York Constitution provides a broader freedom of the press 
than the U.S. Constitution); Mann v. Abel, 10 N.Y.3d 271, 279 (2008) (“Expressions of opinion . . . are 
deemed privileged and, no matter how offensive, cannot be the subject of an action for defamation.”); 
Roth v. United Fed’n of Teachers, 787 N.Y.S.2d 603, 611 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2004) (“[S]tatements 
of opinion are absolutely privileged and shielded from claims of defamation under art. I, § 8 of the NY 
Constitution, no matter how vituperative or unreasonable the opinions may be.”).
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the First Amendment protects anonymous speech.135 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme 
Court extended those protections to statements made on the Internet.136 Despite such 
freedoms, courts limit free speech with tort claims like defamation.137 Any standard 
determining when a court may order the unmasking of anonymous and pseudonymous 
Internet speakers requires a balancing test to address the competing policy 
considerations between the rights of the anonymous speaker and the potential tort 
plaintiff.138 Without balancing an individual’s First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously against a potential plaintiff ’s right to recover for an injury, speech worthy 
of protection could be stif led through pre-action disclosure even with a summary 
judgment requirement.139 This would create a significant chilling effect on Internet 
speech, causing whistleblowers and others whose speech benefits society to censor or 
omit their opinions when publishing on the Internet.140 It is well-documented that 
135. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (striking down an Ohio law prohibiting 
the distribution of pamphlets about ballot issues without attribution, including author’s name and 
address, because such a statute hinders contributions to the marketplace of ideas and hinders the 
protected right of author autonomy, and stating anonymity “exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of 
Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—
and their ideas from suppression”); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of 
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 
60 (1960).
136. 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (The Internet allows “any person with a phone line” to “become a town crier 
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail 
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. We agree . . . that our cases 
provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium.”).
137. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
138. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[R]equiring the court to balance the 
parties’ competing interests is necessary to achieve appropriate rulings in the vast array of factually 
distinct cases likely to involve anonymous speech.”).
139. Consider the following example: Steve, an aide for Congressional Representative X (“X”), anonymously 
blogs this commentary: “X is nothing but a lewd, dirty, slut. She sleeps with all of her co-workers, guys 
and girls alike. She even uses State funds to pay prostitutes for sexual favors. I know, because I work for 
her.” The first two statements are false, but the last two statements are true. While Congress investigates 
the allegations, X brings a libel suit against the anonymous blogger for the two false statements. Using 
a summary judgment standard, the court finds the statements libelous per se because the false statements 
imply statements of fact, are distributed to the public on the blog, and imply that X is sexually 
promiscuous and a homosexual. (X would not need to demonstrate malice because that information is 
contingent on having knowledge of Steve’s identity.) Without a balancing test, a court will not be able 
to prevent the pre-action disclosure of Steve’s identity to protect the legitimate political speech of his 
third statement, which was made in the public’s interest. While Steve may not be a deep pocket, X is 
now free to obtain Steve’s true identity and to retaliate against Steve for blowing the whistle.
140. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (acknowledging that a 
fear of courts unmasking anonymous Internet speakers “would have a significant chilling effect on 
Internet communications and thus on basic First Amendment rights”); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 
451, 457 (Sup. Ct. Del. 2005) (reasoning that a “‘sue first, ask questions later’ approach, coupled with a 
standard only minimally protective of the anonymity of defendants, will discourage debate on important 
issues of public concern as more and more anonymous posters censor their online statements in response 
to the likelihood of being unmasked”); Lidsky, supra note 1, at 889 (“[T]hese new libel suits may chill 
simply by threatening to reveal the identities of those who speak their minds online. . . . As more and 
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over the past fifteen years, as courts have faced cases involving anonymous and 
pseudonymous Internet speakers with greater frequency,141 large employers and 
powerful government officials have used weak pre-action disclosure standards as a 
method for intimidating and retaliating against whistleblowers attempting to warn 
the public about corruption or illegal activity.142 The disparity between the weak and 
strong standards in different jurisdictions creates forum-shopping opportunities for 
these powerful interests, adding to anonymous Internet speakers’ vulnerability.143 
Thus, a balancing test weighing the rights of an injured plaintiff against the value of 
the speech in question is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure Internet 
speakers are able to continue to exercise their First Amendment right of anonymous 
free speech. It provides courts with a necessary stop-valve to guard speech intended 
for protection by the U.S. and New York Constitutions that a summary judgment 
standard could not protect by itself.144
 Therefore, New York courts should abandon the “meritorious cause of action” 
test in favor of the three-factor Mobilisa test.
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 What did the Cohen court’s decision accomplish? It can be argued that the New 
York Supreme Court’s decision did more harm than good. In the end, Ms. Cohen 
did not bring a defamation lawsuit.145 Ms. Port is currently attempting to sue Google 
for complying with the court order.146 The media, including many websites, had a 
field day with the issue, providing both Ms. Cohen and Ms. Port with large amounts 
more suits are filed, many Internet users will come to recognize the ease with which their online 
anonymity can be stripped simply by the filing of a libel action, and they will censor themselves 
accordingly.”).
141. See Ciolli, supra note 97, at 176 (“The issue has become especially important in recent years, as plaintiffs 
are increasingly using the civil subpoena process to force anonymous Internet speakers to unveil their 
identities.”).
142. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 889, 903 (“[C]orporate plaintiffs easily can make out a prima facie libel claim 
any time they receive harsh criticism online. Once a complaint is filed, it is a simple matter to get a 
subpoena to force the ISP to divulge the anonymous defendant’s identity. . . . Although many of the new 
libel plaintiffs are powerful corporate Goliaths suing to punish and to deter their critics, some are 
not.”). 
143. See Ciolli, supra note 97, at 185 (“Without a uniform standard, plaintiffs who seek to silence, intimidate, 
or otherwise harass their anonymous critics can also forum shop to take advantage of the radically 
different tests applied by the various courts.”).
144. See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]ithout a balancing step, the 
superior court would not be able to consider factors such as the type of speech involved, the speaker’s 
expectation of privacy, the potential consequence of a discovery order to the speaker and others similarly 
situated, the need for the identity of the speaker to advance the requesting party’s position, and the 
availability of alternative discovery methods.”).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 52–53.
146. George Rush, Outed Blogger Rosemary Port Blames Model Liskula Cohen for ‘Skank’ Stink, N.Y. Daily 
News (Aug. 23, 2009, 7:44 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/gossip/2009/08/23/2009-08-23_
outted_blogger_rosemary_port_blames_model_liskula_cohen_for_skank_stink.html.
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of publicity. Blogs continue to publish offensive comments about Ms. Cohen.147 
Although it would be unfair to speculate as to Ms. Cohen’s motives in this litigation, 
we do know this: the Cohen court’s opinion served only to delete a poorly visited blog 
and publicly embarrass its author.
 The instability in New York surrounding pre-action disclosure of anonymous 
and pseudonymous Internet speakers’ identities must end. While many anonymous 
and pseudonymous opinions on the Internet are petty and trite, others provide 
meaningful and beneficial information that helps fuel and shape contemporary public 
debate. Internet commentary must be taken in its broad social context, and such 
context should ref lect the thoughts and impressions of today’s reasonable Internet 
user. Authors of political and critical opinion choose anonymity for a reason: to 
protect themselves against threats of intimidation and retaliation by the powerful 
interests those opinions indict. New York needs a new, uniform standard to protect 
these anonymous Internet speakers; the three-factor Mobilisa test is the proper 
standard to adopt.
147. See Liskula Cohen Skank Really Big Blogspot, Liskula Cohen (Aug. 28, 2009, 8:50 AM), http://
liskulacohenskankreallybig.blogspot.com; Mike Payne, Liskula Cohen vs. Rosemary Port: Who’s Hotter?, 
Style Crave (Aug. 29, 2009), http://stylecrave.com/2009-08-24/liskula-cohen-vs-rosemary-port-
whos-hotter/ (presenting pictures of both models and a quiz where a viewer may vote for either “Liskula 
Cohen,” “Rosemary Port,” “Both!,” or “Ugh, Skanks!” with twenty percent of the anonymous voters 
choosing the “Ugh, Skanks!” option).
